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Iterative versus standard deferred acceptance: Experimental evidence 
by Inácio Bó and Rustamdjan Hakimov* 
We run laboratory experiments where subjects are matched to colleges, and colleges are 
not strategic agents. We test the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus 
the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching mechanism based on a 
new family of procedures being used in the field, in which information about tentative 
allocations is provided while students make choices. We consider two variations of IDAM: 
one in which they are only informed about whether they are tentatively accepted or not 
(IDAM-NC) and one in which students are additionally informed at each step of the 
tentative cutoff values for acceptance at each school (IDAM). A significantly higher 
proportion of stable outcomes is reached both under IDAM and IDAM-NC than under DA. The 
difference can be explained by a higher proportion of subjects following an equilibrium 
strategy akin to truthful behavior under IDAM and IDAM-NC than truthful behavior itself 
under DA. Moreover, the provision of intermediate cutoff values in IDAM leads to higher 
rates of equilibrium behavior than in IDAM-NC and a higher robustness of stability 
between the rounds of experiments. Our findings provide substantial support for the rising 
practice of using iterative mechanisms in centralized college admissions in practice. 
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1 Introduction
The use of central clearinghouses for matching prospective students to universities or schools,1
as well as theoretical and empirical studies of those procedures that are used have been
steadily increasing in recent decades. The vast majority of them consist of procedures in
which students submit rank-ordered lists of universities, universities submit rankings (or
priorities) of students (often based on the students’ grades in exams), and produce a matching
of students to universities. Since considerations of fairness based on these priorities are often
important, one of the primary goals of the designers of these procedures is to ensure the
stability of the allocation. Given that designers also account for the incentives induced in
the students, from the theoretical perspective the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA)
mechanism is often seen as the best mechanism: it is strategy-proof and (constrained) efficient
from the students’ perspective [Balinski and Sönmez, 1999]. One problem, however, is that
growing experimental and empirical evidence suggests that participants often misreport their
preferences under DA despite truth-telling being a dominant strategy under the mechanism.
This may lead to unstable, and thus to unfair allocations.
Bo and Hakimov [2016] have recently proposed a mechanism for matching students to
colleges, denoted Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), based on a modification
of a mechanism currently being used to match students to university programs in Brazil.
IDAM asks students to apply to one of the universities available in each of a number of
periods. Throughout the allocation process, a university can hold no more applications than
its number of seats and if a university receives more applications than its capacity then
it rejects the students with lower priorities, while the remaining applications are retained.
After each step, all students are informed about whether their application was rejected or
retained. Moreover, the minimum corresponding grades among the retained students of each
university are publicly announced at the end of each step. If an applicant is rejected, she
can apply to any other university where the cutoff grade is lower than her grade. Students
are not allowed to make applications while tentatively selected by some university. IDAM
is based on a family of mechanisms that we have observed in the field over the last few
years, notably in Brazil and in the province of Inner Mongolia (China). These mechanisms
differ from most other ones analyzed in the literature in that they do not require students to
submit rank-ordered lists of colleges, but instead repeatedly ask them to choose one college
among a set of “available” ones. Another common feature of these mechanisms is that they
1From this point on, we will refer to the institutions as universities. Unless explicitly stated, all arguments
also hold for schools.
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provide feedback about tentative cut-off grades after each step of the mechanism. If students
follow the simple strategy of choosing the most preferred college among those available at
each step of the IDAM mechanism (denoted the straightforward strategy), the matching
produced as an outcome is the Student Optimal Stable Matching, that is, the matching that
is the most preferred by all students among all stable matchings. While, unlike the standard
DA mechanism, IDAM does not have a dominant strategy, the authors show that stable
outcomes are equilibrium outcomes under a robust equilibrium concept – Ordinal Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (OPBE) [Bo and Hakimov, 2016]. In a sequential game, a strategy
profile is an OPBE if any deviation strategy is stochastically dominated by following the
equilibrium strategy. Though in theory, IDAM has arguably “worse” incentive properties
for students than its direct counterpart (DA), in practice, students might benefit from the
iterative nature of the game induced, as there is a repeated interaction with the mechanism
during the determination of the allocation, which we show experimentally to consistently
produce stable outcomes.
This paper addresses the following questions: Are there benefits of using iterative, non-
direct, mechanisms when compared to the theoretically superior DA? Is the equilibrium
straightforward strategy in IDAM a better predictor of behavior than the dominant strategy
of truthful reporting in DA? What effect does the provision of intermediate cutoff values in
the IDAM have on individual behavior and the stability of outcomes?
To answer these questions, we run laboratory experiments. Subjects interact with the
mechanism for 20 rounds, playing new market parameters (preferences and priorities) in
every round. Subjects know their preferences and the preferences of other students, they
know their grades, but not the grades of other students. Additionally, they know that grades
were drawn uniformly from a distribution with support [0,100]. We run three treatments
between subjects: DA, IDAM and IDAM-NC. Unlike in IDAM, in IDAM-NC students do
not observe intermediate cut-off grades at every step. Thus, by comparing IDAM and IDAM-
NC, we can identify the effect of the provision of cutoffs on the students’ behaviors and in
the final allocations. We show that both IDAM and IDAM-NC dominate DA in terms of
stability. As for individual strategies, there is a significant and large increase in the proportion
of straightforward and truthful behavior in all treatments comparing the first ten to the last
ten rounds of each treatment, but the proportion of truthful (or straightforward) behavior is
the highest in IDAM, second highest in IDAM-NC and the lowest in DA, with all pairwise
differences being statistically significant.
What drives the success of those iterative mechanisms when compared to DA? First,
IDAM and IDAM-NC are easier to understand and learn, as they “open the box” of the
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mechanism through repeated interaction with it during the determination of the allocation,
while in DA the only interaction that a student has with the mechanism is the submission
of preferences, and thus subjects have to think through the procedure themselves. This
feature of both iterative mechanisms provides the biggest advantage in terms of stability
improvements and proportions of “truthful” behavior relative to DA. Second, the provision
of cutoffs in IDAM leads to a higher proportion of subjects following the straightforward
strategy than in IDAM-NC. This difference is driven by an almost universal adoption of the
straightforward strategy by subjects who were rejected at some step of the mechanism, and
thus observed intermediate cutoffs. Additionally, the provision of cutoffs allows subjects to
observe the fairness of the allocation, which is especially crucial for the persistence of stability
between rounds. In other words, a student can see that any envy she may have results from
her not choosing a university that was more desirable, when that was still available. The first
feature shows a disparity between theory and practice: DA’s theoretical properties lead one
to expect the submission of truthful preferences, as it is a weakly dominant strategy, while
IDAM and IDAM-NC, which have behavior predictions that are less robust, turned out to
lead to higher rates the straightforward behavior of subjects. The findings of the experiment
emphasize the importance of behavioral consideration when designing matching mechanisms.
2 Related literature
One common objective of policymakers, when designing college and school admission mech-
anisms, is to ensure that the outcomes produced are fair. In a fair matching, if a student
is not matched to a more preferred university then every student who is matched to that
university has a higher priority than her. While this objetive is debatable, for university
admissions it is the most natural, as the priorities of students are almost always based on
grades or other performance-based measures. Balinski and Sönmez [1999] showed that DA
can be characterized as the “best” fair mechanism, in that it is strategy-proof and Pareto
dominates any other fair mechanism (that is, it is constrained efficient). In fact, variations of
the DA mechanism are used in many real-life student matching programs around the world.
College and secondary school admissions in Hungary [Biró, 2012], high school admissions in
Chicago [Pathak and Sönmez, 2013] and New York City [Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2009] as well
as elementary school admissions in Boston [Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2006] are examples of real
life use of the DA mechanism.
While strategy-proofness itself may be considered an element of fairness [Pathak and
4
Sönmez, 2008], it also aligns the students’ incentives such that the outcomes have the desirable
efficiency and fairness properties. Recent empirical and experimental evidence suggests,
however, that those incentives may not be fully understood by the subjects and may lead to
assignments that are neither fair nor constrained efficient.
The seminal matching experiment in Chen and Sönmez [2006] suggests that truth-telling
rates are higher under DA than under the Boston mechanism in the school choice problem.
Later experiments, however, showed that truth-telling rates might drop if more information
was made available to the participants [Pais and Pintér, 2008, Pais et al., 2011]. Lately,
some experiments have been conducted to study learning in DA, in which subjects interact
with the mechanism for several rounds. In the baseline treatment of Ding and Schotter
[2015a], subjects play DA repeatedly and only limited learning is observed after 20 periods.
Similar results are presented in Zhu [2015], where the subjects increase the truth-telling
rates with experience, but only in one out of the two markets analyzed. Chen and He
[2016] show that subjects in the experiments are ready to invest in information about the
preferences and priorities of others in DA even after gaining experience with the mechanism,
thus showing that they do not fully understand its strategy-proofness. Moreover, evidence
of manipulation was found in the flagship application of the student-proposing DA – the
match of medical doctors to residency programs in the US (the National Resident Matching
Program). Rees-Jones [2015] shows that around 17% of participants manipulate preference
reports, and around 5% of them declare this manipulation as strategic.2 The numbers might
come across as small, but the misreporting of preferences by even a small fraction of students
often translates into non-stable allocations. Similarly, Hassidim et al. [2015] show that some
students manipulate submitted lists in the Israeli college admissions and Chen and Pereyra
[2015] identify manipulations for school admissions in Mexico City.
Several papers have also tried to address the question of how factors outside of the mech-
anism being used affect truth-telling. Guillen and Hing [2014] and Guillén and Hakimov
[2015] test the effect of advice on the properties of the mechanism (in their case, the top
trading cycles mechanism, which is also strategy-proof) on the truthful reporting in the lab
and the field, respectively. Ding and Schotter [2015b] test how the ability to communicate
with other participants before the submission of preferences affects truth-telling rates and
obtain a negative result: communication makes more subjects change their rank-order lists
2Though the participants can use only constrained lists of preferences, and thus DA is not -strategy proof,
the manipulations that are identified cannot be rationalized by the constrained lists. For instance, the switch
of the order of any two hospitals in the submitted list is clearly pointing to misunderstanding of incentives
of DA.
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relative to the no communication case, but changes go both in the direction of truth-telling
and in the opposite direction. Ding and Schotter [2015a] test the effect of inter-generational
advice on the truth-telling rates and show that it has a detrimental effect on truth-telling
under DA. Summing up, most of the experimental and empirical evidence raises concerns
about participants’ understanding of incentives to report truthfully under DA.
Dur et al. [2015] use the fact that the school choice mechanism used in the Wake County
Public School System allows for students to interact multiple times with the procedure as a
method for empirically identifying strategic players. Interestingly, the dynamic nature of the
procedure, and the information that is made available during the process to the participants,
makes it somewhat comparable to the IDAM mechanism.
Three recent papers also evaluate experimentally indirect sequential mechanisms. Echenique
et al. [2015] consider a two-sided market, with DA being implemented dynamically. The au-
thors found that 48% of outcomes are stable and, surprisingly, the receiving side optimal
stable matching is more likely to be reached than the proposing side. Our results are not
comparable to these results as we run experiments in one-sided settings, where colleges are
not strategic agents. Moreover, authors do not compare the performance of the dynamic DA
to the static counterpart. Gong and Liang [2016] consider, both theoretically and experi-
mentally, the mechanism currently in use to match students to universities in the province of
Inner Mongolia, in China. The authors find that, when compared to DA, the Inner Mongolia
mechanism exhibits higher truth-telling rates in the environment with low preference corre-
lation, but that this does not translate into a higher rate of stable outcomes. In the high
preference correlation environment, on the other hand, there is a higher proportion of stable
outcomes under DA. Although the dynamic mechanism used in Gong and Liang [2016] has
some similarities to IDAM, such as the availability of tentative cutoff grades, it is in fact a
different mechanism, with different timing and incentives. Our results, therefore, are not di-
rectly comparable. Klijn et al. [2016] compare dynamic versions of both the school-proposing
and student-proposing versions of DA to its static counterparts in one-sided settings of the
school choice problem. The dynamic version of the student-proposing DA that they imple-
ment is equivalent to our IDAM-NC treatment.3 In contrast to our results, however, Klijn
et al. [2016] find no statistically significant difference in the proportion of stable outcomes
between the standard and dynamic student-proposing DA. We attribute the distinct results
to two differences in the experimental setup: the size of the market and the information
environment. First, we consider the size of the market, i.e. the number of schools or univer-
3Despite the similarities, those experiments in Klijn et al. [2016] were performed simultaneous and inde-
pendently from the ones in this paper.
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sities. While the market size used in Klijn et al. [2016] is of four schools and four students,
we use markets with eight universities and eight students. Experimental evidence suggests
that larger markets (an thus longer rank-order lists) lead to lower truth-telling rates in di-
rect strategy-proof mechanisms, such as DA and TTC [Chen and Kesten, 2015, Hakimov
and Kesten, 2014], and thus the larger the market the higher is the potential scope for im-
provement over DA. Moreover, larger markets make subjects have more interactions with the
iterative mechanism within one round, involving on average more choices and observations of
its operation, emphasizing its contrast with the one-shot nature of DA. Considering the fact
that the mechanism used, IDAM-NC, differs from DA essentially in its sequentiality, a larger
market is more likely to lead to the differences between the mechanisms. Regarding the infor-
mation environment, the difference in the information that subjects have about preferences
and priorities might also influence the results: Klijn et al. [2016] use complete information,
while in our setup there is uncertainty regarding priorities.
3 Mechanisms and hypotheses
In this section we describe the matching mechanisms that we test in the lab. They correspond
to the three treatments that we run. At the end of the section we formulate the experimental
hypotheses.
The student-proposing Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance mechanism (DA)
DA is a direct mechanism. It collects universities capacities and students’ submitted rank-
order lists of universities simultaneously, which are used by the algorithm below to produce
the final allocation. Universities’ priorities over students are strict and exogenously given.4
• Step 1
– Every student applies to her first choice. Each university rejects the least-ranked
students in excess of its capacity and temporarily holds the others.
• Step k ą 1
– Every student who is rejected in step k ´ 1 applies to the next most preferred
university according to the submitted rank-order list. Each university pools to-
gether new applicants and those who are held from step k ´ 1 and rejects the
4Note that for the goal of this study we use students’ grades as an instrument to impose priorities.
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lowest-ranked students in excess of its capacity. Those who are not rejected are
temporarily held by the universities.
The process terminates after any step without rejections. Each university is then matched
to the students being held.
The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism with no cutoffs (IDAM-NC)
IDAM-NC is not a direct mechanism. The allocation procedure is implemented in an itera-
tive way, with students receiving intermediate feedback (whether a student was temporarily
accepted or rejected at a previous step) during the execution of the mechanism, and might
be required to perform additional actions. Whenever a student is asked to make a choice, the
only restriction is that she cannot choose a university which has rejected her in a previous
step. More specifically:
• Step 1
– All students are asked to apply to one of the universities.
– Each university rejects the least-ranked students, among those who applied to
it, in excess of its capacity and temporarily holds the others. If no application
is rejected, the procedure will stop at this step, matching the universities to the
students they hold.
• Step t ą 1
– Students who are not held at some university are asked to apply to any universities
which have not rejected them in a previous step.
– Each university rejects the least-ranked students, among those held and those
who applied to it, in excess of its capacity and temporarily holds the others.
If no application is rejected, the procedure will stop at this step, matching the
universities to the students they hold.
The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism (IDAM)
IDAM is not a direct mechanism. Just like in IDAM-NC, the allocation procedure is imple-
mented in an iterative way, with students receiving intermediate feedback during the exe-
cution of the mechanism, and might be required to perform additional actions. Differently
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from the IDAM-NC mechanism, in the IDAM students are additionally informed about cutoff
values at the end of each step, or even the universities which would reject their application
based on the grades of the students currently held. More specifically:
• Step 1
– All students are asked to apply to one of the universities.
– Each university rejects the least-ranked students, among those who applied to
it, in excess of its capacity and temporarily holds the others. If no application
is rejected, the procedure will stop at this step, matching the universities to the
students they hold.
– The cutoffs of each university is made public. For universities where the number
of students held is smaller than their capacities, the value of the cutoff by the end
of step 1 is zero. For the other universities, the value of the cutoff in each one of
them is the lowest grade in that university among its retained students.
• Step t ą 1
– Students who are not held at some university are asked to apply to universities
where the cutoff value is lower than their grades in those universities.
– Each university rejects the least-ranked students, among those held and those
who applied to it, in excess of its capacity and temporarily holds the others.
If no application is rejected, the procedure will stop at this step, matching the
universities to the students they hold, and leaving students who are not held at
any university unmatched.
– The cutoffs of each university is made public.
The summary of treatments and predictions of individual behavior are presented in Table
1. In DA, truthful submission of rank-ordered list is a weakly dominant strategy, while
straightforward strategy is an equilibrium in IDAM and IDAM-NC.5
Based on these observations, we form the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The proportion of subjects submitting truthful rank-order lists in DA
is higher than the proportion of subjects playing the straightforward strategy in IDAM and
IDAM-NC.
5Even in the absence of cutoffs, a straightforward strategy may not dominant if the strategy of a student
depends, for instance, on the step when she is rejected from a certain college.
9
Table 1: Predictions of individual behavior by treatments
DA IDAM IDAM-NC
Truthful reporting Straightforward strategy Straightforward strategy
(weakly dominant strategy) (OPBE) (OPBE)
Hypothesis 2: The proportion of stable outcomes is higher in DA than in IDAM and
IDAM-NC.
The second hypothesis is based on hypothesis 1. If subjects do not follow the predictions
in Table 1, any matching can be produced as an outcome. Therefore, as we expect more
subjects to submit truthfully in DA, on average, we should expect a higher proportion of
stable outcomes in DA than in IDAM or IDAM-NC.
4 The Experiment
In this section, we present a series of experiments designed to test DA versus IDAM and
IDAM-NC. This experimental design is not the first one we tried. Originally we ran sessions
under constant market conditions (the same preference profiles and priorities) and complete
information. Our findings were in line with findings of the current experiments from perspec-
tive of stability and efficiency. However, we identified that some of the design choices made
did not allow us to observe individual strategies in a robust way, and so we ran additional
experiments which are reported here. As this experiment supersedes the previous one, we
report the results of the first one in the online appendix.6 It does not mean, however, that
the value of the first experiments is zero, to contrary, we think they prove the robustness of
our findings.
4.1 Experimental design
In the experiment, there were eight universities that differed in quality and specialization.
Each university had only one seat. Universities admitted students based on an exam grade.
There were eight students who applied for seats at universities, and each student had a
grade for math and a grade for language. Universities M1, M2, M3 accepted based on
the math grade only. Universities L1, L2, L3 accepted based on the language grade only.
Universities H1 and H2 accepted based on the average grade between math and language.
In all treatments, students received 22 euros if they were assigned to their most preferred
6The online appendix can be found at http://www.inaciobo.com/research.html.
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university, 19 euros to their second most preferred university, 16 euros to their fourth most
preferred university, and so on. Students received 1 euro if they were assigned to their least
preferred university. Each treatment lasted for 20 rounds. At the end of the experiment, one
round was randomly drawn to determine the participants’ payoffs. Each round represents
a new market. The preferences used in each market were generated following the designed
market idea of Chen and Sönmez [2006]. For each of markets, we generated the qualities
of universities uniformly and randomly distributed between [0,40]. It corresponded to the
utility of each university for subjects and was common for all subjects. Additionally, for each
subject and university we generated a random component of utility from the interval [0,20].
Finally, each subject had an additional utility of 20 for one of the groups of universities:
either math, language or hybrid. This is to model the student specific preference for a field
of study. The group for each subject was determined randomly. The resulting utilities were
transformed into ordinal preferences. The grades were independently drawn, in each round,
from the uniform distribution with support [1,100], for math and language.7 There is a
unique stable matching in all markets except for those used in rounds 8, 14, and 20, where
there are two stable matchings.
In the experiment, subjects could see tables with the ordinal preference of all students, as
well as the distribution of exam grades, but they could only see the realization of their own
exam grade. This design choice was done for the following reasons: complete information
about preferences make it closer to reality than no information, as by observing the preference
table, subjects could have an idea about the popularity of each university, which is typically
known in reality. The realizations of the grades of other students were not known, and we
argue that this also approximates the informational conditions to reality. After each round
a subject received the feedback about the university in which she got a slot, and not the
allocation of other students.
We use markets with eight schools, which are relatively large if compared with the exper-
imental literature, for two reasons:
1. There is evidence that relatively high share (from 65 to 85 percents) all subjects con-
verge to submitting truthfully in DA in markets with three or four schools (Chen and
Kesten [2015], Zhu [2015]) in repeated experiments. However, based on cross studies
observations and evidence in Chen and Kesten [2015]8 for DA and Hakimov and Kesten
[2014] for TTC, we expect lower proportions of truthful submissions in DA when the
7The details of all markets are presented in the online Appendix.
8The truth-telling rates are lower in six schools environment than in four school environment (75% versus
45% in the last 10 periods).
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rank-ordered lists are longer. Thus, we create a larger room for potential improvement
for the iterative mechanisms. 9
2. The large number of schools is crucial to test the difference between DA and IDAM,
as the iterative mechanisms are less sensitive than the direct ones to the increase in
the number of universities, as the decision in each step is the submission of just one
university from the list.10
As mentioned in the previous section we use three treatments: DA, IDAM and IDAM-NC.
The comparison of iterative mechanisms with DA is the focus of current paper. We use both
IDAM and IDAM-NC to disentangle the effect that the provision of cut-off grades during the
execution of the mechanism has from the simple iterative nature of the procedure, on both
subjects’ behavior and the allocation properties.
The experiment was run at the experimental economics lab at the Technical University
of Berlin. We recruited student subjects from our pool with the help of ORSEE [Greiner
et al., 2003]. The experiments were programmed in z-Tree [Fischbacher, 2007]. For each of
the three treatments, independent sessions were carried out. Each session consisted of 24
participants that were split into three matching groups of eight for the entire session. We use
fixed matching groups in order to increase the number of independent observations and allow
for maximum learning. We are not concerned about repeated game caveats, due to the fact
that every round represents a new environment, and incomplete information does not allow
subjects to identify strategies of the players in previous rounds.11 In total, 12 sessions with
288 subjects were conducted. Thus we have 96 subjects and 12 independent observations
per treatment. On average, the experiment lasted 115 minutes and the average earnings per
subject were 25.20 euros, including a show up fee of 5 euros.
At the beginning of the experiment, printed instructions were given to the participants (see
Appendix). Participants were informed that the experiment was about the study of decision-
9Our markets with eight universities and eight students are the largest markets considered so far in
repeated matching experiments: Ding and Schotter [2015a] use a market with five students but only four
different profiles, Chen and Kesten [2015] with four and six students, Gong and Liang [2016] and Klijn et al.
[2016]both use markets with four students and four schools, and Zhu [2015] with three students. The only
exception is the large-scale experiment by Chen et al. [2015], however, the large market in the experiment
was created by increasing the number of students with similar profiles, while we create a higher number of
different student profiles.
10In the case of one school, DA and IDAM are the same, while in the case of 1,000 schools, the submission
of the full list in DA is almost unfeasible in practice, while following the straightforward strategy in IDAM
still constitutes a simple task at each given step.
11Additionally, there are no reputational concerns in the matching game, that would hamper interpretation
of subjects’s strategies as possible strategies in a one-shot game, given the experience.
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making, and that their payoff depended on their own decisions and the decisions of the other
participants. The instructions were identical for all participants of a treatment, explaining
in detail the experimental setting. Questions were answered in private. After reading the
instructions, the experimenter went through the solution of an example of an allocation task
on the whiteboard and allowed for public questions. After that, all individuals participated
in a multiple choice quiz to make sure that everybody understood the main features of the
experiment.
After the quiz, and before the start of the first round, participants were asked to solve
an allocation task which appeared on the screen of their computers. The correct solution
of the task had to be typed in and, if it was correct, participants earned 2 euros. For the
DA treatment, participants were shown the submitted list of virtual students on the screen
and their grades and they had to determine the final allocation. For the IDAM and IDAM-
NC treatments, participants saw the decision of each student in the first step and had to
determine the retained and rejected students in each school. If it was done correctly they
were informed about the decisions of rejected students, and so on until a final allocation was
reached. In case of a mistake at any step the task stopped and the solution was counted as
incorrect. We introduced the incentivized task to be sure that every participant paid enough
attention to the details of the mechanisms and to have a measure of the understanding of
the mechanics of mechanisms.
4.2 Results
We first present the aggregate results on the level of allocations in order to compare the
treatments. In the second step, we study individual behavior in the treatments to compare
it to the equilibrium predictions and to shed light on the reasons for the aggregate findings.
The significance level of all our results is 5%, unless otherwise stated. In the section we
use for tests, either non-parametric tests if the data are defined on the level of independent
observations or clustered regressions on the level of independent observations if the data
are defined on the individual or round level. The details of the regression are presented in
notes of tables with p-values. In the main text we only use p-values, without mentioning the
details in order to simplify the exposition. We use signs > in the results between treatments to
communicate significantly higher. We use => to communicate higher at the 10% significance
level.
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Table 2: Proportions of stable allocations by treatments:
DA IDAM
IDAM-NC DA=IDAM, DA=IDAM-NC IDAM=IDAM-NC
p -value p-value p-value
Round 1-10 (1) 26.7% 54.2% 52.5% 0.00 0.01 0.85
Round 11-20 (2) 47.5% 76.7% 68.3% 0.00 0.01 0.34
All rounds (3) 37.1% 65.4% 60.4% 0.00 0.00 0.47
p-value first 10 = last 10 (4) 0.00 0.01 0.03
Notes: All the p-values are p-values for the coefficient of the dummy in the probit regression of the
dummy for stable outcome on the dummy for the corresponding treatment (columns 5, 6, 7) or the last
10 rounds (row 4). The standard errors of the probit models are clustered on the level of the matching
groups. Thus for within-treatment regressions we have 12 clusters (row 4), and for between treatments
24 clusters (columns 5, 6, 7).
4.2.1 Aggregate results: Stability and efficiency
In this section, we compare properties of the allocations reached in each of the treatments. We
take two perspectives on each of the parameters: learning within treatments and comparison
of the outcomes between treatments in the last 10 rounds of the experiment and in all 20
rounds..
Result 1 (Stability):
1. There is a significant increase in the proportion of stable outcomes reached in the last
10 when compared to the first 10 rounds in all treatments.
2. Comparison of average proportions of stable outcomes in the last 10 rounds leads to
the following results: IDAM>DA, IDAM-NC>DA. Comparison of average proportions
of stable outcomes in all rounds leads to the following results: IDAM>DA, IDAM-
NC>DA.
Support.
Figure 1 presents the average proportions of stable outcomes by treatments grouped by
five rounds.
The proportions of stable outcomes by treatments and rounds are presented in Table 2.
We observe a significant increase in the proportions of stable outcomes in all treatments. The
average proportion of stable outcomes is significantly higher in IDAM and IDAM-NC than in
DA. The difference is significant in both the first 10 and the last 10 rounds of the experiment.
Thus we reject Hypothesis 2. As for the difference in the number of stable outcomes between
IDAM and IDAM-NC, we observe no significant difference. This indicates that the difference
regarding stability between DA and two treatments with iterative mechanisms is driven
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Figure 1: Proportions of stable outcomes
mainly by the iterative nature of these mechanisms, and not by the provision of information
about cutoffs. Note, however, that in the last five rounds of the experiment, the proportion
of stable outcomes in on average 15% higher in IDAM than in IDAM-NC (and the difference
is 10% significant, p=0.09).
Another way to look at the stability results is to consider only persistent stable outcomes.
Sometimes a stable outcome is reached by a group for one or two rounds, but it is not reached
in the following rounds. In the following, we treat these outcomes as non-persistent stable
outcomes, as this pattern might be a sign that some subjects are still trying to change
strategies, hoping that could lead them to obtain a better outcome. Next, we consider only
persistent stable outcomes i.e., situations in which stable outcomes are reached in a certain
period and then in all rounds until the last period of the experiment. For each group, we
calculate the number of consecutive stable outcomes before the last round. Thus, for instance,
if a group reached stable outcomes in rounds 16, 18, 19, and 20, but not in 17, we count the
persistent stability of this group to be equal 3. If a group failed to reach a stable outcome in
the round 20 then the variable is equal to 0. The number of consecutive stable allocations can
be interpreted as an indicator of how robust the groups are in reaching a stable allocation,
despite the different parameters of the markets between rounds.12
12For the markets in which there are more stable allocations, we consider any stable allocation. This choice
is inconsequential, though. There were only four instances in which an allocation which is stable but not
student-optimal: two groups in DA, one in IDAM and one in IDAM-NC. All of them in the 20th round.
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Figure 2: Number of consecutive stable outcomes
Result 2 (Persistent stability): The comparison of the average number of consecu-
tive stable allocations before the last round leads to the following results: IDAM>DA,
IDAM>IDAM-NC.
Support. Figure 2 presents the average number of consecutive stable allocations before the
last round by treatments.
The average number of consecutive stable allocations in IDAM is the highest among
the three treatments and is equal to 5.7. Thus, on average, in rounds 14 or 15, stable
allocations are reached in IDAM and remain so until round 20. The difference is significant
in comparison to both other treatments: Wilcoxon rank-sum test (12 values versus 12 values)
two-sided p-values for the comparison of IDAM with DA is 0.01, and IDAM with IDAM-NC
0.05. The difference between DA and IDAM-NC is not significant (p-value 0.38). Thus,
despite the absence of difference between the average proportions of stable allocations in
IDAM and IDAM-NC, once the persistent, or robust, stability is considered, IDAM performs
significantly better than IDAM-NC. Thus, persistence of stability can be attributed to the
effect of the information: providing intermediate feedback about the cut-off grades reveal
to students the fact that the allocation reached is stable or “fair” with respect to their last
choices, while in IDAM-NC, students do not know that and it might induce them to change
their strategies between rounds. We investigate this hypothesis in further details in the next
section, when we analyze individual strategies.
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Table 3: Average efficiency of allocations by treatments:
DA IDAM IDAM-NC
DA=IDAM, DA=IDAM-NC IDAM=IDAM-NC
p -value p-value p-value
Round 1-10 (1) 97.4% 99.2% 99.4% 0.06 0.03 0.66
Round 11-20 (2) 98.3% 99.0% 99.4% 0.44 0.27 0.67
All rounds (3) 97.8% 99.1% 99.4% 0.04 0.00 0.60
p-value first10 = last 10 (4) 0.55 0.84 0.97
Notes: All the p-values are p-values for the coefficient of the dummy in the OLS regression of the average
payoff of allocations on the dummy for the corresponding treatment (columns 5, 6, 7) or the last 10
rounds (row 4). The standard errors of the regressions are clustered on the level of the matching groups.
Thus, for within-treatment regressions we have 12 clusters (row 4), and for between treatments 24 clusters
(columns 5, 6, 7).
Summing up results 1 and 2, we observe that both treatments with an iterative deferred
acceptance mechanism lead to higher proportions of stable outcomes. Interestingly, there is
no significant difference in the proportion of stable outcomes for IDAM and IDAM-NC, but
the availability of information about cutoffs leads to a higher persistence of stable allocations
between rounds.
Though the main focus of this paper from the perspective of allocation analysis is stability,
as we are motivated by college admissions where priorities have to be respected, we also
compare the efficiency of the outcomes produced by the mechanisms evaluated. In order to
analyze the efficiency of an allocation, we define efficiency as the sum of the payoffs of all the
subjects in the allocation produced, divided by the sum of the payoff in the student-optimal
stable allocation.
Result 3 (Efficiency): There is no significant difference in efficiency between treatments
in the last 10 rounds, but if all rounds are considered, a comparison of the average efficiency
lead to the following: IDAM>DA, IDAM-NC>DA
Support. Table 3 presents the average payoffs of participants by treatments and rounds,
grouped by five.
Row 4 in Table 3 presents the p-values for the significance of difference in efficiency
between the first 10 and the last 10 rounds in each treatment. Efficiency does not differ
between the first 10 and the last 10 rounds in any of the treatments. However, the level
of efficiency is close to 100%. This can be explained by the fact that not every violation
of stability of an allocation leads to a lower sum of payoffs, and some may even lead to a
higher sum of payoffs. As for the between-treatment comparison, in IDAM and IDAM-NC
treatments we observe a higher average efficiency than in DA in the first 10 rounds of the
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experiment. The difference is also significant if all rounds are considered (see rows 5 and 6
of Table 3).
This completes our analysis of allocations by treatments. IDAM and IDAM-NC perform
significantly better than DA from perspective of stability, and also outperform DA from the
efficiency perspective.
4.2.2 Individual behavior
Next, we analyze individual strategies of experimental subjects in order to test hypothesis
1 and better understand the drivers of the observed differences between the proportions
of stable outcomes produced between treatments. We consider the proportions of subjects
following straightforward behavior in IDAM and IDAM-NC, and the proportion of subjects
submitting truthful rank-ordered lists in DA. To simplify the language, we introduce the
Truthful Criterion:
• Truthful Criterion:
– DA: Truthful submitted list.13
– IDAM: Straightforward strategy: applying to the best university from the prefer-
ence list among the universities that have a cutoff value lower than the student’s
exam grade.
– IDAM-NC: Straightforward strategy: applying to the best university from which
she was not previously rejected.
The Truthful Criterion is based on the theoretical properties of the mechanisms. In DA it
is a weakly dominant strategy, while in IDAM and IDAM-NC it is an OPBE. It leads to a
student-optimal stable match in all treatments, if played by all subjects of a group.
Result 4 (Behavior in line with the Truthful Criterion):
1. There is a significant increase in the proportion of subjects submitting in line with the
Truthful Criterion in the last 10 compared to the first 10 rounds in all treatments.
2. The comparison of average proportions of subjects submitting in line with the Truthful
Criterion in the last 10 rounds leads to the following results: IDAM>DA, IDAM-
NC>DA, IDAM>IDAM-NC. The comparison of the average proportions of subjects
13Note, that the only non-dominated strategy given the information available for subjects at the experi-
ments is to submit the full truthful list. In our setting there is no “minimum guaranteed allocation”, like a
district school, for instance, as the grades of other students are unknown.
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Figure 3: Behavior in line with the Truthful Criterion
Table 4: Proportions of behavior in line with the Truthful Criterion by treatments:
DA IDAM IDAM-NC
DA=IDAM, DA=IDAM-NC IDAM=IDAM-NC
p -value p-value p-value
Round 1-10 (1) 41% 59% 54% 0.00 0.01 0.42
Round 11-20 (2) 55% 82% 74% 0.00 0.00 0.04
All rounds (3) 48% 70% 64% 0.00 0.00 0.15
p-value first10=last10 (4) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: All the p-values are p-values for the coefficient of the dummy in the probit regression of the dummy
for strategy in line with the Truthful Criterion on the dummy for the corresponding treatment (columns
5, 6, 7) or the last 10 rounds (row 4). The standard errors of the probit models are clustered on the
level of the matching groups. Thus, for within-treatment regressions we have 12 clusters (row 4), and for
between treatments 24 clusters (columns 5, 6, 7).
submitting in line with the Truthful Criterion in all rounds leads to the following
results: IDAM>DA, IDAM-NC>DA.
Support: Table 4 presents the proportions of behavior in line with the Truthful Criterion
and the p-values for test of equality of these proportions between treatments and between
the first 10 and the last 10 rounds.
Row 4 in Table 4 presents the p-values for the difference between the first 10 and the
last 10 rounds of the experiment by treatments. We observe a significant increase in the
Truthful Criterion behavior in all treatments, including DA (see row 4 of Table 4). Despite
the relatively high increase in truthful submissions in DA, the increase of straightforward
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behavior in IDAM and IDAM-NC is even higher.
Figure 3 presents the average proportions of behavior in line with the Truthful Criterion
by treatments and rounds. Overall, the proportion of strategies in line with the Truthful
Criterion is higher in IDAM and IDAM-NC than in DA. The difference is significant for the
first 10, last 10 and all rounds jointly. Thus we can reject Hypothesis 1. Despite the fact
that from a theoretical perspective we should expect higher truthful rates in DA, as it is a
weakly dominant strategy, it turned out that IDAM and IDAM-NC lead to higher rates of
straightforward behavior by subjects. As for the difference between IDAM and IDAM-NC,
the proportions of behavior in line with the Truthful Criterion is higher in IDAM, with the
difference being significant for the last 10 rounds of the experiment. Note that this dominance
of IDAM relative to IDAM-NC in the last 10 rounds is translated into a higher proportion
of stable outcomes, but the difference in the proportion of stable outcomes is not significant.
Thus we can conclude that the provision of intermediate feedback about cutoffs has a positive
effect on the proportion of straightforward behavior.
Next, we take a closer look at the manipulations in all three treatments.
Result 5 (Violation of the Truthful Criterion and its determinants):
1. In all three treatments, the probability of violation of the Truthful Criterion is higher
the lower the students’ grades are.
2. The correct solution of the incentivized allocation task at the beginning of the exper-
iment significantly increases the probability of submission in line with the Truthful
Criterion in IDAM and IDAM-NC but not in DA.
3. If IDAM and IDAM-NC are considered: in IDAM, the most common violation of
straightforward behavior is skipping the most preferred university in the first step of
the mechanism. The proportion of violations of straightforward behavior (that is, not
choosing the most preferred option among the available ones,) decreases dramatically
after the first step and reaches almost zero after the third step of the mechanism. In
IDAM-NC the proportion of violations does not change between steps. Controlling for
the number of options available, the proportion of violations in IDAM-NC is signifi-
cantly higher than in IDAM, starting from the second step of the procedure.
Support: Table 5 presents the marginal effects of probit regressions of dummy for play in
line with the Truthful Criterion by treatments. In all treatments, in line with result 4, the
probability of submission in line with the Truthful Criterion increases with the experience
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and its marginal effect is higher in IDAM and IDAM-NC than in DA. The probability of
submitting in line with the Truthful Criterion is also higher the higher the student’s grades.
In all three treatments, the coefficient for average grade is positive and significant. Notably,
this observation is in line with field data for college admissions in Israel, where the DA
mechanism is used [Hassidim et al., 2015].
The dummy for the correct solution of the allocation task at the beginning of the ex-
periment is positive and significant in IDAM and IDAM-NC, while not significant in DA.
It is an interesting finding: if a participant of the experiment was successful in understand-
ing mechanics of the iterative mechanism from instructions and examples, she is 12.9% and
16.2% more likely to use a straightforward strategy in IDAM and IDAM-NC respectively. In
DA, the fact that a participant of the experiment could produce the allocation of the DA
mechanism in the task does not translate into a higher probability of truthful submissions.
This is potentially one of the main concerns about the DA mechanism: the fact that truthful
reporting is a weakly dominant strategy is not easy to infer even having a good understand-
ing of the mechanics of the mechanism. For IDAM and IDAM-NC, going through the steps
of an allocation problem by the mechanism one by one, subjects are more likely to use a
straightforward strategy when interacting with the mechanism.
Table 5: Marginal effects of probit model of submissions in line with the Truthful Criterion
by treatments
(1) (2) (3)
Truthful Criterion Truthful Criterion Truthful Criterion
dummy dummy dummy
DA IDAM IDAM-NC
Round .015˚˚˚ .025˚˚˚ .024˚˚˚
(.002) (.003) (.003)
Average grade .003˚˚˚ .004˚˚˚ .006˚˚˚
(.001) (.001) (.001)
Correct solution of the allocation task -.048 .129˚˚˚ .162˚˚˚
(.076) (.031) (.059)
Female dummy -.005 .008 .057
(.077) (.048) (.064)
Math-related major dummy .081 .017 .058
(.070) (.037) (.063)
Observations 1920 1920 1920
No. of clusters 12 12 12
log(likelihood) -1282.22 -1042.37 -1110.40
Standard errors in parentheses
˚ p ă 0.10, ˚˚ p ă 0.05, ˚˚˚ p ă 0.01. Math-related major dummy is equal to
1 if a subject study economics, computer science or math, and 0 otherwise.
21
Figure 4: Behavior in line with the Truthful Criterion
Next, we take a closer look at the differences in straightforward behavior between IDAM
and IDAM-NC. Table 6 presents the marginal effects of probit regressions of straightforward
submission (that is, choosing the most preferred available university in each step) depending
on the round, the number of available options, and the treatment by steps of the mechanism
(the sample includes only IDAM and IDAM-NC). Figure 4 presents the average proportions
of straightforward behavior by groups of five rounds in IDAM and IDAM-NC, depending on
the step of the mechanism. Decision in step 1 are the first decisions, and being straight-
forward requires choosing the most preferred university. There is no significant difference
between IDAM and IDAM-NC in terms of the proportions of truthful most preferred univer-
sity submissions (see column one of Table 6). Note that one of the possible explanations for
deviations from straightforward behavior is that subjects try to skip applications to univer-
sities where they think they are likely to be rejected. We call this “skipping” behavior. The
fact that we observe average grade as a predictor of straightforward behavior supports this
explanation.
Decisions in steps 2 and 3 are taken after one and two rejections, respectively. Note that, in
IDAM, straightforward behavior requires the application to the best university among those
available given the published cutoffs. In IDAM-NC subjects are not aware of the cutoffs, and
thus straightforward behavior requires the application to their second choice in the second
step. In the third step of IDAM-NC, straightforward behavior requires the application to
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Table 6: Marginal effects of probit model of straightforward submission depending on the
average grade by cycles of the mechanism.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Straightforward Straightforward Straightforward Straightforward
step=1 step=2 or step=3 step=4 or step=5 step>5
Round .017˚˚˚ .011˚˚˚ .008˚˚˚ .020˚˚˚
(.002) (.001) (.002) (.004)
IDAM .007 .186˚˚˚ .215˚˚˚ .272˚˚˚
(.041) (.033) (.031) (.042)
# of available options -.009 -.074˚˚˚ -.025˚˚˚
(.006) (.012) (.008)
Observations 3840 3081 1290 1269
log(likelihood) -2107.61 -1228.01 -578.49 -672.46
Standard errors in parentheses
˚ p ă 0.10, ˚˚ p ă 0.05, ˚˚˚ p ă 0.01. # of available options represents the number of universities with
corresponding cutoff grades being lower than the student’s at the moment of decision in IDAM, and
equals the number of schools that have not rejected the student before the current step of the mechanism.
the next choice relative to the university they were rejected from in the second step. This
leads to the following: due to the simple fact that the number of options available after each
step in IDAM is weakly smaller than under IDAM-NC, the likelihood of a behavior being
consistent with a straightforward strategy, by pure mechanics, is greater under IDAM than
under IDAM-NC. To control for that fact, we added the number of options available to the
student at each step to the regression.
Starting from steps 2 and 3, the probability of straightforward behavior is significantly
higher in IDAM than in IDAM-NC, controlling for the number of options available (see
columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 6). The difference can be explained by the fact that in IDAM
participants see the cutoffs in the feedback of the first and all consequent steps, which makes
the mechanism different from IDAM-NC. Skipping behavior is most likely driven by partici-
pants’ beliefs about which university is available to them and a desire to avoid unnecessary
choices and rejections. In IDAM-NC, the feedback of each step does not provide any infor-
mation except that the chosen university is not available to them (the one that rejected them
in the previous step). In IDAM, however, starting from the second step, participants see
the cutoffs and thus some uncertainty about the availability of universities is resolved, and
thus subjects do not need to form beliefs about universities where they have chances to be
accepted.
Summing up the results of the experiment, we found that IDAM and IDAM-NC lead to
a significantly higher proportion of stable allocations than DA. The iterative structure of the
game leads to a higher proportion of stable allocations, while the provision of intermediate
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feedback during the procedure contributes to the persistence of this stability between rounds.
The aggregate findings are explained by a higher proportion of subjects playing in line with
the Truthful Criterion: the iterative nature of the game leads to a large improvement in the
proportion of Truthful Criterion behavior when compared to DA, but the provision of cutoffs
makes the improvement significantly larger. The latter is explained by an almost universal
adoption of a straightforward behavior by the subjects after the first rejection, once the
cut-off grades of universities are published.
5 Discussion
Our findings demonstrate the benefits of the IDAM mechanism, especially with the provision
of intermediate feedback about the cutoff grades, when compared to the standard student-
proposing DA. We mainly attribute the success of the iterative mechanism to the fact that
subjects find it easier to understand, in terms of its incentives and strategic considerations.
The comparison between the IDAM and DA mechanisms is somewhat similar to the
comparison of English and second-price sealed bid auctions. Li [2015] presented one possi-
ble explanation for the difference in behavior observed in the lab in these two strategically
equivalent auction formats: while English auction is obviously strategy-proof, the second-
price sealed bid auction is not. That, however, cannot be used to explain our results between
IDAM and DA, as the former is not even strategy-proof, but we believe that the intuition
is somewhat similar. Although here, unlike in the English auction, subjects do not see a
perfect connection between the actions at each step and the final outcome, as acceptances
are only tentative, in IDAM, unlike DA, they can track the intermediate consequences of
their actions. Additionally, the cut-off grades published at every step of the mechanism lead
subjects to observe a particular kind of mistake. If a subject did not behave straightfor-
wardly and skipped a choice which would have accepted her, she can immediately see this
by observing the cut-off grades. This seems to lead subjects to regret the skipping behavior
in future rounds or steps of the mechanism and thus converge to straightforward behavior.
Given the popularity of DA, these findings might make policymakers reconsider DA as
the optimal mechanism for implementing matching procedures, where stability is put as the
main criterion of interest. On one hand, DA is easier to implement, as it requires only
a one-shot submission of preferences, while the IDAM mechanism requires more intensive
use of technology, such as access to the internet and perhaps commitment on the part of
participants to stay online for some time. Given the rapid development of technologies, in
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most countries access to the internet, especially among those who aim to enter a university,
is no longer a binding factor, and thus we argue that the potential benefits of the iterative
version are higher than the costs. The mere fact that iterative mechanisms are being used to
match millions of students to universities in Brazil and China indicates that these constraints
are not extremely limiting.
We expect especially high advantages of using mechanisms such as the IDAM in large
markets with a high number of universities (this argument is in line with the observation that
our surveyed attempts of using the iterative mechanisms are observed in massive markets like
those in Brazil and Inner Mongolia). In these markets, where there is a high number of uni-
versities or schools, real-life use of DA would require a dramatic constraint of the length
of the list when compared to the total number of universities and would thus lose its the
main benefit, i.e., strategy-proofness. In the IDAM mechanism, the constraint comes as the
number of steps.14 However, in reality, we argue that the mechanism should be implemented
with as many steps as possible.15Although one could argue that requiring multiple inter-
actions with the mechanism may pose a significant cost over the students, we believe that
modern technologies can provide an interactive feedback, which would allow participants to
follow the straightforward strategy by spending a very short period of time in each step and
thus simplifying implementation of the almost unconstrained IDAM. In Brazil, for example
students are currently able to update their choices via a free cellphone “app”.
Moreover, in markets with a large numbers of universities, the feedback of the iterative
mechanism is more valuable than in small markets. This is due to the fact that in big markets
participants must be aware of what universities are within their reach, and providing real-
time feedback with the updated information about the cut-off grades serves as a very valuable
tool.
Lastly, we would like to mention that one important factor, which may influence the
success of iterative mechanisms such as IDAM, would be the exact way in which the inter-
action and design of the feedback are implemented. Although these features are beyond this
study, we argue that they are of significant importance, and thus should be tested with real
participant by methods such as focus groups and field testing before implementation.
14In the online Appendix we describe an additional series of experiments in which constrained versions
of IDAM and DA (restricted number of periods in IDAM and restricted length of the ranking in DA) are
compared. There we show that the benefits of the IDAM mechanism over DA also takes place when using
the restricted versions.
15Note that the mechanism implemented in Inner Mongolia is run in almost continuous time, and thus the
number of steps could be counted as unconstrained.
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Appendix
Instructions of the experiment
Welcome! This is an experiment about decision-making. You and the other participants in
the experiment will participate in a situation where you have to make a number of choices.
In this situation, you can earn money that will be paid out to you in cash at the end of the
experiment. How much you earn depends on the decisions that you and the other participants
in the experiment make.
These instructions describe the situation in which you have to make a decision. The
instructions are identical for all participants in the experiment. It is important that you
read the instructions carefully so that you understand the decision-making problem well. If
something is unclear to you while reading, or if you have other questions, please let us know
by raising your hand. We will then answer your questions individually.
Please do not, under any circumstances, ask your question(s) aloud. You are not permit-
ted to give information of any kind to the other participants. You are also not permitted to
speak to other participants at any time throughout the experiment. Whenever you have a
question, please raise your hand and we will come to you and answer it. If you break these
rules, we may have to terminate the experiment.
Once everyone has read the instructions and there are no further questions, we will con-
duct a short quiz where each of you will complete some tasks on your own. We will walk
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around, look over your answers, and solve any remaining comprehension problems. The only
purpose of the quiz is to ensure that you thoroughly understand the crucial details of the
decision-making problem.
Your anonymity and the anonymity of the other participants is guaranteed throughout
the entire experiment. You will neither learn about the identity of the other participants,
nor will they learn your identity.
General description
This experiment is about students who are trying to enter a university. The 24 participants
in the room are grouped into three groups of eight persons each. These eight participants
represent students competing for university seats. You will compete with the same seven
participants for the whole experiment. The experiment consists of 20 independent decisions,
which represent the students admission processes. At the end of each round every student
will receive at most one seat in one of the universities or will remain unassigned. In the end
of the experiment one round will be randomly drawn to determine your payment.
There are eight universities that differ in quality and specialization. Each university has
only one seat. Universities admit students based on their final exam grade. Each student
has a grade for math and a grade for language. Universities M1, M2, M3 accept based
on the math grade only. Universities L1, L2, L3 accept based on the language grade only.
Universities H1 and H2 accept based on the average grade of math and language.
Instructions for DA
Your payoff depends on a seat of the university you will be assigned to. In order to get a
seat at any university you will have to participate in the centralized allocation mechanism.
At the beginning of each round you will submit the list of your preferences to the centralized
allocation mechanism, and it will use the lists of all the participants in order to determine
allocation. All the steps of the allocation described below take place without any further
interactions from the students. Thus, the only thing required for the allocation from the
students’ side is to submit their lists of preferences.
The allocation procedure is implemented in the following way:
1. The mechanism sends applications from all students to the university of their top
choice (the one which is stated first in the submitted list sent to the allocation mechanism).
2. Throughout the allocation process, a university can hold no more applications than its
number of seats. If a university receives more applications than its capacity then it rejects
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the students with the lowest relevant score (math grade for M1, M2, M3; language grade for
L1, L2, L3, and average grade for H1,H2). The remaining applications are retained.
3. Whenever an applicant is rejected at a university, her application is sent to the next
highest university on her submitted list.
4. Whenever a university receives new applications, these applications are considered
together with the retained applications for that university. Among the retained and new
applications, those with the lowest relevant grades in excess of the number of the slots are
rejected, while the remaining applications are retained.
5. The allocation is finalized when no more applications can be rejected. Each participant
is assigned a slot at the university that holds his/her application at the end of the process.
Example for DA
Example: In order to understand the mechanism better, let us go through an example to-
gether. If you have any questions about any step of the allocation procedure please feel free
to ask at any point. There are six students (ID numbers from 1 to 6) on the market, and
three universities (University M1, University L1, and University H1) with two seats in each
university. Students have the following grades in their exams:
Student1 Student2 Student3 Student4 Student5 Student6
Math 80 90 60 90 70 40
Language 50 20 80 30 76 82
Average 65 55 70 60 73 61
University M1 ranks students based on the math grade only, University L1 grades students
based on the language grade only, and university H1 ranks students based on the average of
the two grades. Students submitted the following school rankings in their decision sheets:
Student ID 1 2 3 4 5 6
Top choice L1 H1 M1 H1 H1 M1
Middle choice H1 M1 H1 L1 M1 H1
Last choice M1 L1 L1 M1 L1 L1
This allocation method consists of the following steps:
Step 1.
Students 3 and 6 apply for a seat at M1. University M1 has two seats available for
allocation and two applicants, thus students 3 and 6 are retained at University M1.
Student 1 applies to University L1. University L1 has two seats and only one applicant,
thus student 1 is retained in University L1.
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Students 2, 4, and 5 apply for University H1, but it has only two seats available for
allocation, thus one of the applicants must be rejected. University H1 ranks students based
on the average grade for math and language: student 2 has average grade of 55, student 4
has 60 and student 5 has 73. Among the applicants, student 2 has the lowest average grade,
thus student 2 is rejected, and students 4 and 5 are retained at University H1.
Retained students Applications Rejected
in the beginning of the round of the step students
University M1 - 3,6 -
University L1 - 1 -
University H1 - 2,4,5 2
Step 2.
Student 2 is the only student who was rejected in the previous step. She applies to her
second choice – University M1. Now University M1 considers student 2 together with the
retained students who applied to University M1 in the previous step – students 3 and 6.
So the University has three applications for two seats, thus one of the applicants must be
rejected. University M1 ranks students based on the math grade: student 2 has a math grade
of 90, student 3 has 60 and student 6 has 40. Student 6 has the lowest math grade among
the applicants, thus student 6 is rejected from University M1, while students 2 and 3 are
retained.
Retained students Applications Rejected
in the beginning of the round of the step students
University M1 3,6 2 6
University L1 1 - -
University H1 4,5 - -
Step 3.
Student 6 applies to University H1. So the University has three applications for two
seats, thus one of the applicants must be rejected. University H1 ranks students based on
the average grade: student 4 has the average grade of 60, student 5 has 73 and student 6
has 61. Student 4 has the lowest average grade among applicants, thus he is rejected from
University H1.
Retained students Applications Rejected
in the beginning of the round of the step students
University M1 2,3 - -
University L1 1 - -
University H1 4,5 6 4
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Step 4.
Student 4 applies for University L1. Thus, there are two applications for two seats at
University L1. No one is rejected. All current retained allocations are finalized.
Retained students Applications Rejected
in the beginning of the round of the step students
University M1 2,3 - -
University L1 1 4 -
University H1 5,6 - -
Thus, the final allocation looks as follows: University M1 – students 2, 3; University L1
– students 1, 4; University H1– students 5, 6.
Instructions for IDAM
Your payoff depends on a seat of the university you will be assigned to. In order to get a seat
at any university you will have to participate in the centralized allocation mechanism.The
allocation procedure is implemented in the following way:
1. All students apply to one of the universities.
a. Throughout the allocation process, a university can hold no more applications than its
number of seats. If a university receives more applications than its capacity then it rejects
the students with the lowest relevant score (math grade for M1, M2, M3; language grade for
L1, L2, L3, and average grade for H1,H2). The remaining applications are retained.
2. Each student is informed about whether her application was rejected or retained.
Moreover, the minimum corresponding grades of retained students of all universities are
publicly announced. If an applicant is rejected at a university, she can send the application
to any other university. If an applicant is retained at a university, she is not active at this
step.
3. Whenever a university receives new applications, these applications are considered
together with the retained applications for that university. Among the retained and new
applications, those with the lowest relevant grades in excess of the number of the slots are
rejected, while the remaining applications are retained. All students see the result of the step.
Each university publishes the minimum corresponding grade of the retained students. If an
applicant is rejected at a university, she can send the application to any other university. If
an applicant is retained at any university, she is not active at this step.
4. Step 3 is repeated until allocation is finalized. The allocation is finalized when no more
applications can be rejected. Each participant is assigned a slot at the university that holds
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his/her application at the end of the process.
Example for IDAM
In order to understand the mechanism better, let us go through an example together. If you
have any questions about any step of the allocation procedure please feel free to ask at any
point.
There are 6 students (ID numbers from 1 to 6) on the market, and three universities
(University M1, University L1, and University H1) with two seats in each university. Students
have the following grades in their exams:
Student1 Student2 Student3 Student4 Student5 Student6
Math 80 90 60 90 70 40
Language 50 20 80 30 76 82
Average 65 55 70 60 73 61
University M1 ranks students based on the math grade only, University L1 grades students
based on the language grade only and university H1 ranks students based on the average of
the two grades.
This allocation method consists of the following steps:
Step 1.
Students took the following decisions about their application: Students 3 and 6 apply to
M1, student 1 applies to L1, and students 2, 4 and 5 apply to H1.
Students 3 and 6 apply for a seat at M1. University M1 has two seats available for
allocation and twp applicants, thus students 3 and 6 are retained at University M1.
Student 1 applies to University L1. University L1 has two seats and only one applicant,
thus student 1 is retained in University L1.
Students 2, 4 and 5 apply for University H1, but it has only two seats available for
allocation, thus one of the applicants must be rejected. University H1 ranks students based
on the average grade for math and language: student 2 has average grade of 55, student 4
has 60 and student 5 has 73. Among the applicants, student 2 has the lowest average grade,
thus student 2 is rejected, and students 4 and 5 are retained at University H1.
Retained students Applications Rejected Minimum
in the beginning of the step of the step applications accepted grade
University M1 - 3,6 - 40
University L1 - 1 - 0
University H1 - 2,4,5 2 60
Note, that if a university has a free seat the minimum accepted cut-off grade is zero.
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Step 2.
Student 2 is the only student who was rejected in the previous step, thus she is the only
one who is active at this step.
She decides to apply to University M1.
Now University M1 considers student 2 together with the retained students who applied
to University M1 in the previous step – students 3 and 6. So the University has three
applications for two slots, thus one of the applicants must be rejected. University M1 ranks
students based on the math grade: student 2 has a math grade of 90, student 3 has 60 and
student 6 has 40. Student 6 has the lowest grade among the applicants, thus student 6 is
rejected from University M1, while students 3 and 2 are retained.
Retained students Applications Rejected Minimum
in the beginning of the step of the step applications accepted grade
University M1 3,6 2 6 60
University L1 1 - - 0
University H1 4,5 - - 60
Step 3.
Student 6 is the only student who was rejected in the previous step, thus she is the only
one who is active at this step.
Student 6 decides to apply to university H1.
University H1 considers student 6 together with the retained students – students 4 and
5. So the university has three applications for two seats, thus one of the applicants must be
rejected. University H1 ranks students based on the average grade: student 4 has an average
grade of 60, student 5 has 73 and student 6 has 61. Student 4 has the lowest average grade
among the applicants, thus he is rejected from University H1.
Retained students Applications Rejected Minimum
in the beginning of the step of the step applications accepted grade
University M1 2,3 - - 60
University L1 1 - - 0
University H1 4,5 6 4 61
Step 4.
Student 4 is the only student who was rejected in the previous step, thus she is the only
one who is active at this step.
Student 4 decides to apply for University L1.
University H1 considers student 4 together with the retained students – student1. Thus,
34
there are two applications for two seats at University L1. No one is rejected. All current
retained allocations are finalized.
Retained students Applications Rejected Minimum
in the beginning of the step of the step applications accepted grade
University M1 2,3 - - 60
University L1 1 4 - 30
University H1 4,5 6 4 61
Thus the final allocation looks as follows: University M1 – students 2, 3; University L1 –
students 1, 4; University H1 – students 5, 6.
Instructions for IDAM-NC
Your payoff depends on a seat of the university you will be assigned to. In order to get a seat
at any university you will have to participate in the centralized allocation mechanism.The
allocation procedure is implemented in the following way:
1. All students apply to one of the universities.
a. Throughout the allocation process, a university can hold no more applications than its
number of seats. If a university receives more applications than its capacity then it rejects
the students with the lowest relevant score (math grade for M1, M2, M3; language grade for
L1, L2, L3, and average grade for H1,H2). The remaining applications are retained.
2. Each student is informed about whether her application was rejected or retained. If
an applicant is rejected at a university, she can send the application to any other university.
If an applicant is retained at a university, she is not active at this step.
3. Whenever a university receives new applications, these applications are considered
together with the retained applications for that university. Among the retained and new
applications, those with the lowest relevant grades in excess of the number of the slots are
rejected, while the remaining applications are retained. All students see the result of the
step. If an applicant is rejected at a university, she can send the application to any other
university. If an applicant is retained at any university, she is not active at this step.
4. Step 3 is repeated until allocation is finalized. The allocation is finalized when no more
applications can be rejected. Each participant is assigned a slot at the university that holds
his/her application at the end of the process.
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Example for IDAM-NC
In order to understand the mechanism better, let us go through an example together. If you
have any questions about any step of the allocation procedure please feel free to ask at any
point.
There are 6 students (ID numbers from 1 to 6) on the market, and three universities
(University M1, University L1, and University H1) with two seats in each university. Students
have the following grades in their exams:
Student1 Student2 Student3 Student4 Student5 Student6
Math 80 90 60 90 70 40
Language 50 20 80 30 76 82
Average 65 55 70 60 73 61
University M1 ranks students based on the math grade only, University L1 grades students
based on the language grade only and university H1 ranks students based on the average of
the two grades.
This allocation method consists of the following steps:
Step 1.
Students took the following decisions about their application: Students 3 and 6 apply to
M1, student 1 applies to L1, and students 2, 4 and 5 apply to H1.
Students 3 and 6 apply for a seat at M1. University M1 has two seats available for
allocation and twp applicants, thus students 3 and 6 are retained at University M1.
Student 1 applies to University L1. University L1 has two seats and only one applicant,
thus student 1 is retained in University L1.
Students 2, 4 and 5 apply for University H1, but it has only two seats available for
allocation, thus one of the applicants must be rejected. University H1 ranks students based
on the average grade for math and language: student 2 has average grade of 55, student 4
has 60 and student 5 has 73. Among the applicants, student 2 has the lowest average grade,
thus student 2 is rejected, and students 4 and 5 are retained at University H1.
Retained students Applications Rejected
in the beginning of the step of the step applications
University M1 - 3,6 -
University L1 - 1 -
University H1 - 2,4,5 2
Step 2.
Student 2 is the only student who was rejected in the previous step, thus she is the only
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one who is active at this step.
She decides to apply to University M1.
Now University M1 considers student 2 together with the retained students who applied
to University M1 in the previous step – students 3 and 6. So the University has three
applications for two slots, thus one of the applicants must be rejected. University M1 ranks
students based on the math grade: student 2 has a math grade of 90, student 3 has 60 and
student 6 has 40. Student 6 has the lowest grade among the applicants, thus student 6 is
rejected from University M1, while students 3 and 2 are retained.
Retained students Applications Rejected
in the beginning of the round of the step applications
University M1 3,6 2 6
University L1 1 - -
University H1 4,5 - -
Step 3.
Student 6 is the only student who was rejected in the previous step, thus she is the only
one who is active at this step.
Student 6 decides to apply to university H1.
University H1 considers student 6 together with the retained students – students 4 and
5. So the university has three applications for two seats, thus one of the applicants must be
rejected. University H1 ranks students based on the average grade: student 4 has an average
grade of 60, student 5 has 73 and student 6 has 61. Student 4 has the lowest average grade
among the applicants, thus he is rejected from University H1.
Retained students Applications Rejected
in the beginning of the round of the step applications
University M1 2,3 - -
University L1 1 - -
University H1 4,5 6 4
Step 4.
Student 4 is the only student who was rejected in the previous step, thus she is the only
one who is active at this step.
Student 4 decides to apply for University L1.
University H1 considers student 4 together with the retained students – student1. Thus,
there are two applications for two seats at University L1. No one is rejected. All current
retained allocations are finalized.
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Retained students Applications Rejected
in the beginning of the round of the step applications
University M1 2,3 - -
University L1 1 4 -
University H1 4,5 6 4
Thus the final allocation looks as follows: University M1 – students 2, 3; University L1 –
students 1, 4; University H1 – students 5, 6.
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